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Abstract
Private equity ﬁrms are drivers of the ongoing international restructuring process.
Extensive use of leverage gives private equity ﬁrms a tax advantage in the market
for corporate control. We show that with limited deductibility of acquisition costs,
these tax advantages will aﬀect the eﬃciency of the market for corporate control:
a private equity ﬁrm can outbid more eﬃcient incumbent bidders. These ineﬃcien-
cies can be substantial if bidding competition or competition in the product market
is limited. We also show that there are too many buyouts and acquisitions in a
double taxation system because acquisitions create deductions for buyers.
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11 Introduction
Private equity ﬁrms are increasingly important owners of corporate assets. During the
period 1985 to 2006 they have bought corporate assets in the U.S. yearly at an average
value of approximately 1% of the total U.S. stock market value, with a top value of 3%
in 2006 (Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)). Moreover, in 2005 around 2% of US non-farm
employees worked in a private equity backed ﬁrm (Davis et al. (2009)). The growth in
the number of buyouts worldwide has been staggering: Strömberg (2008) estimates that
the value of all transactions between 1970 and 2000 was $0.9 trillion, while the value
of transactions between 2000 and 2007 was close to $2.7 trillion (in 2007 US dollars).
Consequently, private equity ﬁrms are important drivers of the ongoing international
restructuring process.
However, there is a concern that these private equity buyouts are mainly driven by
tax advantages and not eﬃciency advantages.1 In particular, commentators argue that
favorable tax treatment gives private equity ﬁrms advantages over other bidders in the
market for corporate control. The fear is that private equity buyouts take place simply for
tax reasons, thus resulting in ineﬃcient asset ownership and a reduction in government
tax revenues.
Policy responses range from attempts to ensure tax neutrality and transparency, to
a more direct intervention in capital structure, competition policy, and corporate gover-
nance (Walker (2007); PSE (2007)). For example, several countries have already taken
some steps to reduce the deductibility of interest payments and goodwill: Denmark has
passed a law that limits deductions and Germany has enacted a law limiting the de-
ductibility of net interest expenses to below 30% of EBITA, which is similar to laws
adopted in Italy (Thomsen (2009)).
The starting point of this paper is that tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms stem
from their business model: to acquire ﬁrms using heavy leverage, restructure them and
then resell them. This implies that they can take on higher debt levels, thereby beneﬁt-
ting to a greater extent than incumbent ﬁrms from the tax shield of debt. It has been
acknowledged in the empirical literature that private equity backed ﬁrms indeed have a
tax advantage created by extensive use of debt. Badertscher et al. (2009) empirically doc-
ument that majority owned private equity backed ﬁrms face lower marginal tax rates as
a result of the tax shield of debt. Kaplan (1989) has also shown empirically that interest
deductibility beneﬁts equal 21% of the premium paid in leveraged buyout transactions.2
This raises the issue of why other ﬁrms do not use leverage to the same extent to
1See, for instance, “Testing the Model: Private Equity Faces a More Hostile World” (Jul 9 2009, The
Economist), “Editorial, New Rules for Private Equity” (August 30 2009, New York Times) or “Private
Equity Fights Tax Plan” (February 27 2009, Financial Times).
2See also Schipper and Smith (1991), Landsman and Shackelford (1995) and Newbould et al. (1992).
The data is on leveraged management buyouts 1979-1985 in the US.
2beneﬁt from the tax shield of debt. One explanation proposed in the literature is that
private equity backed ﬁrms have more concentrated ownership than publicly traded ﬁrms,
thus giving the owners stronger incentives to reduce agency problems in the ﬁrm. One
way of achieving this is to increase leverage in order to force the ﬁrm to pay out free cash
ﬂow (Jensen (1986)). A second explanation is that private equity ﬁrms are temporary
owners of assets. Private equity ﬁrms therefore have stronger incentives to restructure
target ﬁrms and also stronger incentives to take on debt to give management incentives
to undertake restructuring activities (Norbäck et al. (2010)).
Apart from these explanations, private equity backed ﬁrms can have a tax advantage
compared to publicly traded ﬁrms due to less reporting requirements as private equity
backed ﬁrms are not listed on a stock exchange. Publicly traded ﬁrms are subject to
tighter bookkeeping, accounting and reporting standards which imposes a restriction on
tax planing. Furthermore, private equity ﬁrms are repeat borrowers in the capital market
allowing them to use leverage to a greater extent to ﬁnance an acquisition. Indeed,
Axelson et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the leverage in private equity backed ﬁrms cannot be
explained by the same factors that explain leverage in non-private equity backed ﬁrms.
Instead, debt market conditions seem to entirely determine the leverage in private equity
backed ﬁrms.
Given that the behavior of private equity ﬁrms gives them tax advantages, the purpose
of this paper is to study how these tax advantages (i) aﬀect the eﬃciency of the market for
corporate control, (ii) aﬀect tax revenues, and (iii) how these eﬀects depend on acquisition
cost deduction rules and the intensity of competition.
To this end, we develop an endogenous asset ownership model with taxation. Our for-
malization of the tax system corresponds to a double taxation system. In many countries,
among these the United States and many European countries, income from corporate in-
vestment is taxed twice: at the corporate level a corporate tax is levied on proﬁts, and
at the investor level realized capital gains are subject to capital gains taxes.3
Our model has three types of agents that are subject to taxation: a target ﬁrm,
incumbents competing in the market, and private equity ﬁrms. A private equity backed
ﬁrm has the ability to beneﬁt from increased deductions at the corporate level due to the
tax shield of debt. The target ﬁrm is up for sale through a ﬁrst price perfect information
auction. If a sale takes place, capital gains taxes are paid on the sales price by the target’s
owners. On the other side of the deal, an acquiring ﬁrm pays corporate level taxes on
proﬁts and capital gains taxes are paid on proﬁts net corporate taxes. If no sale takes
place, corporate taxes are paid on the target’s proﬁts and capital gains taxes are paid by
the target’s owners on proﬁts net of corporate taxes.
Within this setting, the extent to which tax advantages aﬀect ownership eﬃciency and
tax revenues depends on acquisition cost deduction rules and the intensity of competition
3See Sørensen (1995). For a discussion of the Swedish system, see Lodin et al. (2001).
3in the market. Tax advantages do not aﬀect asset ownership eﬃciency or tax revenues if
acquisition costs are fully deductible. Thus, if private equity ﬁrms are less eﬃcient owners
of assets, they are not able to acquire them in equilibrium as more eﬃcient incumbents
can outbid them. This occurs despite tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms, since
under full deductibility of acquisition costs, incumbents and private equity ﬁrms have a
maximum willingness to pay for the target equal to the proﬁts net of taxes. At this price,
they make zero proﬁts and thus pay no taxes. If bidding competition makes them pay
their full valuation, no taxes are paid and thus, the acquisition price and the equilibrium
allocation of the assets do not depend on taxes or tax advantages!
But when will tax advantages aﬀect ownership eﬃciency and tax revenues? We iden-
tify three situations: (i) limited competition among private equity ﬁrms, (ii) limited
deduction of acquisition costs, and (iii) the presence of oligopolistic externalities in the
product market.
Limited competition among private equity ﬁrms means that tax advantages aﬀect
tax revenues, but not ownership eﬃciency. A tax advantaged ineﬃcient private equity
ﬁrm can still not overbid a more eﬃcient incumbent, but a more eﬃcient private equity
ﬁrm can now make a net gain from the buyout. The reason is that the acquisition price
is below the maximum willingness to pay of the private equity ﬁrm. Consequently, tax
advantages reduce tax payments and thereby tax revenues.
The goodwill associated with the acquisition is typically not fully deductible from cor-
porate taxes in most jurisdictions (where goodwill is deﬁned as the part of the acquisition
price above the value of deductible assets in the acquired ﬁrm4). Limited deductibility of
acquisition costs means that tax advantages will not only aﬀect tax revenues, but also
ownership eﬃciency. The reason is that the seller’s reservation price depends on corpo-
rate taxes, since corporate taxes are paid if the assets are not sold. A private equity
ﬁrm’s willingness to pay for the target now also depends on corporate taxes since the
acquisition costs are not fully deductible. Consequently, a less eﬃcient private equity
ﬁrm with favorable tax treatment can thereby acquire the assets from a more eﬃcient
original owner and also outbid other (more eﬃcient) incumbents.
Finally, the presence of oligopolistic externalities in the product market (and limited
deductibility) means that tax advantages are of importance for ownership eﬃciency. Pri-
vate equity buyouts often take place in concentrated markets. A potential problem with
incumbent acquisitions in these types of industries is that they could increase the market
power. This market power motive for acquisitions means that incumbent acquisitions can
take place even though a private equity ﬁrm would run the business more eﬃciently. Tax
advantages for private equity backed ﬁrms could then help prevent market power driven
mergers. However, there is also a friction against incumbent acquisitions in oligopolies
4Dunne and Ndubizu (1995) report that acquisitions are associated with diﬀerent international ac-
counting and tax treatments for goodwill and that these have changed over time.
4since incumbent acquisitions are associated with a replacement eﬀect. Hence, less eﬃ-
cient private equity ﬁrms with tax advantages can also outbid both the target and more
eﬃcient incumbents.
The large literature on corporate taxation and ﬁrm investment does typically not
study the eﬀects of taxes on ownership eﬃciency. However, an emerging literature on
international taxation acknowledges the importance of tax eﬀects on ownership eﬃciency.
This literature proposes the concept of Capital Ownership Neutrality (CON) to ensure
that taxes do not distort ownership eﬃciency.5 Desai and Hines (2004) point out that
in a perfect competition framework with ownership asymmetries, CON requires that
tax rules do not distort ownership patterns, which is equivalent to the ownership of
an asset residing with the potential buyer who has the highest reservation price in the
absence of tax diﬀerences. Devereux (2008) extends the deﬁnition by proposing that
global neutrality requires two principles: (i) Direct “CEN”: that taxes should not distort
the location of corporate activity, and (ii) Market neutrality: that taxes should not
distort competition between any companies operating in the same market. Becker and
Fuest (2010) combine an optimal tax model with a non-strategic acquisition model and
study when international exemption is an appropriate policy choice. Becker and Fuest
(2009) use a similar framework to analyze tax competition and tax coordination when
both source and residence based taxation are available.
However, these studies abstract from how potential buyers’ valuations of target ﬁrms
and potential sellers’ reservation prices depend on the tax system. Our approach explicitly
allows for ﬁrms to be acquired through auctions, and accounts for deductions related to
both tax shields of debt and acquisition costs. By incorporating these features into an
acquisition model with asymmetric buyers, we are able to show that taxes aﬀect ownership
eﬃciency also in domestic settings where diﬀerent types of owners of corporate assets are
able to utilize deductions to diﬀerent degrees. In particular, private equity ﬁrms enjoying
tax advantages from the ability to use greater leverage can aﬀect ownership eﬃciency
despite tax rates and the ability to make deductions being equal in the tax code for
all types of owners! Moreover, we show that in a system of double taxation, if the
goodwill associated with acquisitions is deductible, too many acquisitions will occur from
an eﬃciency perspective even though tax rates are equalized since acquisitions create
deductions for buyers that are not available to sellers. Then, we show that a single
taxation system with full goodwill deductibility would be CON (abstracting from inter-
temporal eﬀects of taxes).
Our paper is also a contribution to the theoretical merger literature, which typically
5Musgrave (1969) introduced the terms “capital export neutrality (CEN)” and “capital import neu-
trality (CIN)”, which are now in common use. CEN holds if any individual investor faces the same
eﬀective tax rate on her investments, wherever those investments are located. CIN holds if all invest-
ments undertaken in the same jurisdiction face the same eﬀective tax rate.
5treats taxes as cursory.6 An exception is Auerbach and Reishus (1998) who use a marriage
market model of mergers to show that tax savings can trigger mergers.7 Norbäck et al.
(2009) use a more detailed acquisition model with double taxation and allow for an
imperfectly competitive product market. They ﬁnd that reductions in foreign proﬁt taxes
tend to trigger ineﬃcient foreign acquisitions, while reductions in foreign capital gains
taxes could trigger eﬃcient foreign acquisitions.8 We add to this literature by analyzing
how details of the tax system (the level of deductions of goodwill and tax shields) aﬀect
the merger pattern and ownership eﬃciency. In particular, we show that in a double
taxation system, too many acquisitions take place (from an eﬃciency perspective) if the
goodwill associated with acquisitions is deductible. The reason is that acquisitions create
deductions for buyers that are not available to sellers.
Finally, while there is no formal work on private equity buyouts and taxes of which
we are aware, there is a small emerging public economics literature on venture capital,
ﬁrm development, and taxes. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) and Keuschnigg and Nielsen
(2004) focus on the eﬀects of various tax policies when entrepreneurs face ﬁnancial con-
straints and set up a contract with a venture capitalist under conditions of one-sided or
two-sided moral hazard. Our focus diﬀers as we study when taxes and details of the tax
system matter for the eﬃcient allocation of assets, speciﬁcally accounting for tax advan-
tages for private equity backed ﬁrms arising as a result of them using a higher leverage
in the ﬁrms they acquire.
Our paper consists of four parts. In Section 2, we start out by providing a brief
overview of private equity buyouts, the private equity business model, and from where
private equity tax advantages may stem. Then, in Section 3, we set up a benchmark en-
dogenous asset ownership model with taxation and full deductibility of acquisition costs.
We show how tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms have no eﬀect on ownership eﬃciency
and tax revenues. Then, we move on to study limited bidding competition (Section 4.1)
and limited deductibility (Section 4.2). We show that under each of these modiﬁcations,
tax advantages can aﬀect ownership eﬃciency and/or tax revenues. Finally, we take a
more general perspective in Section 5 and ask what type of tax system is consistent with
6There is a small literature on cross-border acquisitions and taxes that abstracts from ownership
eﬃciency asymmetries. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) propose a model with asymmetric information
between foreign and domestic owners to explain why capital is so immobile internationally. Becker and
Fuest (2008) analyze tax competition in a model where M&A and greenﬁeld investment are alternative
modes of entry and show that the existence of M&A investment intensiﬁes tax competition. Hauﬂer
and Schulte (2007) consider tax incentives in a model where M&A can take place within and across
borders. They show that ownership patterns are highly important for the welfare implications of tax
policy choices.
7However, using a sample of 318 mergers in the US in the period 1968-1983, they ﬁnd no strong
evidence of tax savings to be inﬂuential for merger decisions, but only for a small subset of mergers.
8Empirically, Hayn (1989) examines a sample of 640 acquisitions during 1970—1985 and ﬁnds that the
announcement period for abnormal returns is positively associated with the tax attributes of the target
ﬁrm. Devos et al. (2009) ﬁnd empirically that a merger contributes 1.64% in additional value due to tax
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Figure 1: The private equity business model. (1) Private equity ﬁrms set up a private
equity fund with a predetermined life span. (2) The general partners raise capital from
institutional investors. (3) Private equity ﬁrms start looking for target ﬁrms to acquire.
(4) When a target is identiﬁed, debt is raised from banks to ﬁnance the acquisition. (5)
The target ﬁrm is restructured and the cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm are used to pay oﬀ part
of the debt. (6) After the ﬁrm has been restructured, the private equity ﬁrm sells the
target ﬁrm. (7) The proceeds from the sale are returned to investors and the private
equity ﬁrm.
CON absent any tax advantages and show that a single taxation system with full good-
will deductibility would be CON. In Section 5, we also show that with limited product
market competition (Section 5.1.2), tax advantages can aﬀect ownership eﬃciency and
tax revenues. We provide a discussion of possible extensions to our framework in Section
6, and end with some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Private equity buyouts
2.1 The business model
We start out with a brief primer on the private equity business model. Private equity
buyouts, or leveraged buyouts, are acquisitions of established companies with stable cash
ﬂows, usually with the help of substantial amounts of leverage. These acquisitions are
sponsored by private equity ﬁrms (often organized as partnerships) that raise money from
institutional investors for private equity funds with a predetermined life span.
The private equity business model works as follows (see Figure 1 for an illustration):
1. Private equity ﬁrms set up a private equity fund with a predetermined life span.
72. The partners in the private equity ﬁrm go out and raise capital from institutional
investors and wealthy individuals.
3. After the target amount of capital has been raised, the fund is closed and the private
equity partners start looking for ﬁrms to acquire and restructure.
4. Once a ﬁrm has been identiﬁed, debt is raised from banks in order to ﬁnance the
acquisition. Private equity ﬁrms usually acquire multiple ﬁrms in each fund, and
each acquisition is ﬁnanced with 60%-90% debt.
5. The target ﬁrm is acquired and restructured. Cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm are used to
pay oﬀ part of the debt.
6. After the ﬁrm has been restructured, the private equity ﬁrm sells the ﬁrm it ac-
quired.
7. The returns from cash ﬂow during the restructuring period and from the sale of the
ﬁrms in the fund are split on a 80/20 basis with 80% going back to the investors in
the private equity fund and 20% going to the private equity ﬁrm.
The private equity buyout industry took oﬀ during the 1980s. As a large wave of
takeovers swept across the U.S., leveraged buyouts became a new phenomenon much
talked about and scrutinized. When the takeover wave receded at the end of the 1980s, so
did a large part of leveraged buyout activities. They did not, however, vanish completely
but instead spread out from the U.S. to other countries. Towards the end of the 1990s
and during the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, the private equity buyout industry once
more emerged and this time on a global scale and with full force. Strömberg (2008)
estimates that between 1970 and 2007, the total value of all ﬁrms subject to a buyout
(worldwide) was $3.6 trillion in 2007 U.S. dollars. At the end of 2007, around 14 000
companies worldwide were owned by private equity funds.
2.2 Tax advantages
The starting point of this paper is that private equity ﬁrms have a tax advantage arising
from the way they do business (and not because they have an advantage in the tax code).
Their business model of temporary ownership of assets and close connections to banks
implies that they can take on higher debt levels and thereby beneﬁt from the tax shield
of debt. It has been acknowledged in the empirical literature that private equity backed
ﬁrms indeed have a tax advantage arising from the extensive use of debt. Badertscher
et al. (2009) empirically document that majority owned private equity backed ﬁrms face
lower marginal tax rates as a result of the tax shield of debt. Kaplan (1989) has also
8shown empirically that interest deductibility beneﬁts equal 21% of the premium paid in
leveraged buyout transactions.9
This raises the issue of why other ﬁrms do not use the same leverage to beneﬁt from
the tax shield of debt? There are several diﬀerent explanations.
1. Private equity backed ﬁrms have more concentrated ownership than publicly traded
ﬁrms, which implies that the private equity ﬁrms have stronger incentives to run
the private equity backed ﬁrm eﬃciently. One way of increasing eﬃciency is to
reduce agency problems in the ﬁrm by increasing leverage leading to a reduction of
the free cash ﬂow available to managers (Jensen (1986)).
2. Private equity ﬁrms are repeated borrowers in the capital market which has given
them advantages in the ﬁnancial market as compared to regular ﬁrms. This allows
them to use leverage to a greater extent. Axelson et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the leverage
in private equity backed ﬁrms cannot be explained by the same factors that explain
leverage in non-private equity backed ﬁrms. Instead, debt market conditions seem
to entirely determine leverage in private equity backed ﬁrms.
3. Private equity ﬁrms are temporary owners of the target ﬁrm. Private equity ﬁrms
therefore have stronger incentives to restructure target ﬁrms and also stronger in-
centives to take on debt to give management incentives to undertake restructuring
activities (Norbäck et al. (2010)).
4. Private equity backed ﬁrms can have a tax advantage as compared to publicly
traded ﬁrms due to less stringent reporting requirements as private equity backed
ﬁrms are not listed on a stock exchange. Publicly traded ﬁrms are subject to tighter
bookkeeping, accounting and reporting standards which imposes a restriction on tax
planing.
The tax advantages we analyze do not stem from speciﬁc tax advantages in the tax
law, but rather they are consequences of the equilibrium behavior of private equity ﬁrms
in comparison to other ﬁrms resulting in the use of more leverage and thus greater beneﬁts
from the tax shield of debt. To our knowledge, the only direct advantage in the tax code
for private equity ﬁrms is related to personal taxation: carried interest (the payment the
private equity partners who run the private equity ﬁrm receive as incentive compensation)
is taxed as capital gains instead of labor income. We discuss this advantage further in
section 6.3.
9See also Schipper and Smith (1991), Landsman and Shackelford (1995) and Newbould et al. (1992).
The data is on leveraged management buyouts 1979-1985 in the US.
93 Baseline model
Having described the private equity business model, we will now present our baseline
model and argue that ownership eﬃciency and tax revenues are unaﬀected by the tax
advantage created by the tax shield of debt for private equity ﬁrms if acquisition costs
are fully deductible from corporate taxes.
3.1 Setup
Consider an industry consisting of several incumbent ﬁrms owning assets necessary for
production. To underscore how tax advantages aﬀect ownership eﬃciency and tax rev-
enues, we initially make the simplifying assumption of no interaction between ﬁrms in
the product market. All incumbents can be viewed as local monopolists active in a seg-
mented market (we relax this assumption in Section 5.1.2). One incumbent, the target,
is up for sale. In stage one, the target arranges an auction to sell its assets. The bidders
are the other incumbents and several private equity ﬁrms which do not have assets in
the market. Given the outcome of the auction in stage one, in stage two the ﬁrms with
assets produce, proﬁts are realized, and taxes are paid.
3.2 Stage 2: Proﬁts and tax payments
The set of potentially producing ﬁrms in the industry is J = {t,i1,i2,..,in,p1,p2,..,pm},
where j ∈ J is an element. The ﬁrst entry refers to the target (t). The second n entries
refer to the n number of incumbents (i) and the ﬁnal m entries to the m number of private
equity ﬁrms (p). The set of (potential) owners of the target ﬁrm’s assets is L = J, where
l ∈ L is an element. Let π(x,l) denote the pre-tax product market proﬁt of the target
ﬁrm given a product market action (x) and the ownership of the target ﬁrm (l).
Taxes are paid as follows. A corporate tax τc is paid on net proﬁts, and a capital
gains tax τg is paid on proﬁts net corporate taxes. In particular:
• If the target’s assets are sold, its owners pay capital gains taxes at the rate τg on
the acquisition price S, i.e. the target’s tax payment is τgS. Thus, we normalize
such that the target’s owners initially acquired the target at zero price.
• If the target’s assets are not sold, the target pays corporate level taxes τc on net
proﬁts and capital gains taxes are paid on net proﬁts at the rate τg, net corporate
level taxes, i.e. the target’s tax payment is τcπ(t) +τg(1 − τc)π(t). Thus, we treat
the ﬁrm as having been closed down when the game ends and therefore, the owner
of the target pays capital tax on the capital gains. Alternatively, we could interpret
the payment as dividends to the owner and then τg would be a dividend tax.
10• If the target’s assets are sold to an incumbent, the incumbent pays corporate taxes
at the rate τc on total net proﬁts. The owners of the incumbent ﬁrm pay capital
gains taxes at the rate τg on the proﬁts net corporate taxes and deductions. An
incumbent acquiring the assets results in tax payments of
τc[π(i) − S] + τg(1 − τc)[π(i) − S]. (1)
• If the target’s assets are bought by a private equity ﬁrm, the private equity backed
ﬁrm pays a corporate tax of τc and the ﬁrm’s investors pay capital gains taxes of
τg on proﬁts net of corporate taxes and deductions. We model tax advantages for
private equity ﬁrms in a reduced-form, such that we assume that they can make an
additional deduction D before paying corporate taxes. With full deductibility of
the acquisition cost, if a private equity ﬁrm acquires the assets, the tax payments
are
τc[π(p) − D − S] + τg(1 − τc)[π(p) − D − S]. (2)
These deductions D, with D ≤ πP(p), can come from multiple sources (in general,
the way in which private equity funds are taxed varies between jurisdictions and between
investors, limited partners and general partners). The main advantage, however, comes
from the tax shield of debt created by extensive use of leverage in private equity buyouts.
Note that this setup is identical to a setup in which both private equity ﬁrms and incum-
bents beneﬁt from the tax shield of debt, but D is the additional advantage of private
equity backed ﬁrms due to their ability to utilize a higher debt level. 10
Let us now turn to the product market behavior. Given ownership l, the target
ﬁrm chooses an action x (a price or a quantity) to maximize its product market proﬁt
(1−τc)(1−τg)[π(x,l)−Sl], where Sl = S if ﬁrm l acquired the target, otherwise Sl = 0.
The optimal action x∗(l) is deﬁned from
(1 − τc)(1 − τg)(π(x
∗,l) − Sl) > (1 − τc)(1 − τg)(π(x,l) − Sl) ∀x. (3)
Thus, taxes do not distort the product market actions.
Since taxes do not aﬀect the optimal action x∗(l), we can deﬁne a reduced-form
product market proﬁt, π (l) = π(x∗(l),l). With symmetry within ﬁrm types, we need
only distinguish between three types of reduced-form proﬁts. The proﬁt for an incumbent
10Since we want to focus on tax advantages for one type of actor in the economy, the additional
deductions D will be exogenous to the model. D could be considered to be endogenous, since leverage
is a factor the private equity ﬁrm could aﬀect. However, Axelson et al. (2010) have shown empirically
that private equity ﬁrms tend to lever up as much as possible: the amount of leverage in private equity
buyout transactions is mainly driven by debt market conditions and not by ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. This
suggests that we can take D to be exogenously given as a result of the private equity business model and
that the extent of D would be driven by debt market conditions.
11acquirer (l = i), π (i), the proﬁt for the target ﬁrm under no sale (l = t), π (t), and the
proﬁt for a private equity ﬁrm (l = p), π (p). For completeness, let us also deﬁne   π(i) as
the proﬁt for an incumbent i1,i2,..,in in its own (monopoly) market. To underscore the
eﬀect of tax advantages of private equity ﬁrms, we assume that   π(i) is independent of the
ownership of the target ﬁrm l and normalize such that   π(i) = 0 (we relax this assumption
in section 5.1.2).
Our measure of ownership eﬃciency is denoted by γl > 0. This parameter corresponds





Thus, Assumption 1 implies that the proﬁts increase due to a more eﬃcient use of
the target ﬁrm’s assets. We then normalize as follows:
Assumption 2 (i) γt = 1, (ii) γl ∈ [0,γmax] for γmax > 1 and l  = t.
We can then deﬁne ownership eﬃciency as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Let lEff = argmaxl π(l) and let l∗ denote the equilibrium ownership of the
target ﬁrm. Under ownership eﬃciency, l∗ = lEff.
Assumption 1 implies that under ownership eﬃciency, the target’s assets will be pos-
sessed by the owner with the highest eﬃciency parameter, γl. Assuming simple monopoly
pricing, ownership eﬃciency will also maximize welfare, since consumers will beneﬁt from
higher eﬃciency through lower prices. This is shown by the following simple example.
Example 1 Let the inverse demand be P = a−
q
s, where a is the consumer’s willingness
to pay for the ﬁrst unit and s is the size of the market (the number of identical consumers).
Let the marginal cost be cl = c−γl, where measures γl constitute the eﬃciency associated
with an owner of type l. Then, x∗(l) = s
a+γl
2 , π(l) = 1
s [x∗(l)]
2 and CS(l) = 1
2 [x∗(l)]
2,
where CS(l) is the consumer surplus.
We will now examine how the tax shield of debt in private equity ﬁrms aﬀects own-
ership eﬃciency and tax revenues.
3.3 Stage 1: The acquisition auction
The acquisition process is depicted as an auction where all incumbents and private equity
ﬁrms simultaneously post bids. Everyone announces a bid, bi, which is either accepted or
rejected by the target’s owner. Following the announcement of bids, the target’s assets
12are either sold at the highest bid price or remain with the target. The acquisition is
solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies.
To solve the acquisition auction and determine bids, we need to determine the valua-
tions of the bidders for obtaining the assets and the target owner’s reservation price for
selling them. To aid in this, we introduce the net gain function ∆l(S) which deﬁnes the
net gain for a bidder/seller of type l if the acquisition price is S.
The net gain for the target’s owner from selling the assets is thus
∆t(S) = S − τgS
￿ ￿￿ ￿
Net proﬁt from sale
−[π(t) − τcπ(t) − τg (1 − τc)π(t)]
￿ ￿￿ ￿
Net proﬁt from no sale
= (1 − τg)[S − (1 − τc)π(t)]. (4)
The reservation price for the target’s owners, vt, can be determined as vt = minS, s.t
∆t(S) ≥ 0. Solving for ∆t(S) = 0, we have
vt = (1 − τc)π(t). (5)
In equation (5), corporate taxes–but not capital gains taxes–aﬀect the reservation value
since capital gains taxes are paid both if a sale takes place and if the assets are kept.
Now turn to an incumbent’s valuation. Suppose that the incumbent pays S to acquire
the target’s assets. Then, the net gain for an incumbent is
∆i(S) = π(i) − S − τc[π(i) − S] − τg (1 − τc)[π(i) − S]
= (1 − τg)(1 − τc)[π(i) − S]. (6)
An incumbent’s maximum willingness to pay for the assets is thus given by vi ≡ maxS,
s.t ∆i(S) ≥ 0. Solving for ∆i(S) = 0, we have
vi = π(i). (7)
Thus, from equation (7), it follows that taxes do not aﬀect the incumbents’ maximum
willingness to pay, vi. The reason is that at an acquisition cost S = π(i), no taxes are
ever paid if the acquisition cost is fully deductible.
Using the same argument, we see that the net gain for a private equity ﬁrm of acquiring
the assets equals
∆p(S) = π(p) − S − τc[π(p) − D − S] − τg (1 − τc)[π(p) − S − D]. (8)
Based on this net gain, we can state a lemma showing that tax advantages do not aﬀect
the bidding behavior.
13Lemma 1 When the acquisition cost is fully deductible at the corporate level and private
equity ﬁrms have tax advantages, D > 0, the maximum willingness to pay for a private
equity ﬁrm bidding for the assets is vp = π(p).
Proof. Initially, π(p) − S − D ≥ 0 must hold, as total deductions (S + D) cannot be
larger than corporate income π(p). Deﬁne  (S) = π(p) − S − D as net income after
deductions, where the income after deductions must be non-negative ( (S) ≥ 0). Then,
equation (8) can be re-written as
∆p(S) =
￿
π(p) − S − (τc + τg (1 − τc))[π(p) − D − S], if  (S) > 0
π(p) − S, if  (S) ≤ 0.
(9)
A private equity ﬁrm’s maximum willingness to pay is vp ≡ maxS, s.t ∆p(S) ≥ 0. Solving
the upper line in equation (9) gives ˜ vp = π(p)+
τc+τg(1−τc)
(1−τg)(1−τc)D. However, if a private equity
ﬁrm were to pay S = ˜ vp, it directly follows that  (S) < 0. Therefore, the maximum
valuation for a private equity ﬁrm must be given solving the lower line in equation (9) to
obtain
vp = π(p), (10)
where  (vp) = 0.
Since we have established that vp = π(p), a private equity ﬁrm’s maximum willingness
to pay is independent of taxes. Given the valuations vt, vi and vp, deﬁned in equations
(5), (7) and (10), we can now solve the auction for the target’s assets and determine the
equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium owner of the target ﬁrm l∗ and the acquisition price S∗ are
described in Table 1.
Ineq: Deﬁnition: Equilibrium Acquisition
owner, l∗ : price, S*:
I1 : vp > vi > vt p vp
I2 : vp > vt > vi p vp
I3 : vi > vp > vt i vi
I4 : vi > vt > vp i vi
I5 : vt > vi > vp t .
I6 : vt > vp > vi t .
Table 1: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price.
Proof. First, bi ≥ maxvl, l = {i,p} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no owner
will post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and ﬁrm
t will accept a bid iﬀ bi > vt. Then, competition within owner groups means that the
equilibrium acquisition price must be vi − ǫ and vp − ǫ for an incumbent acquirer and a
14private equity buyer, respectively. It then follows that a private equity acquisition takes
place at the acquisition price vp−ǫ iﬀ vp > max[vt,vi] and an incumbent acquisition takes
place at the acquisition price vi − ǫ iﬀ vi > max[vt,vp]. Otherwise, no acquisition takes
place.
3.3.1 Ownership eﬃciency and tax advantages
Let us now examine how tax advantages D aﬀect ownership eﬃciency. Competition
between incumbents means that incumbents will always bid vi and competition between
private equity ﬁrms means that a private equity ﬁrm will always bid vp. Lemma 2 then
states that the assets of the target end up with the owner that has the highest valuation,
and that this owner pays his full valuation. Since all valuations vj are independent of tax
advantages, D, we can then state our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the acquisition cost is fully deductible at the corporate level,
then the equilibrium ownership pattern, l∗, is independent of tax advantages, D.
Tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms arising from the tax shield of debt are of no
importance for ownership eﬃciency since additional deductions are meaningless when the
acquisition cost is so high that there remain no proﬁts from which to make deductions.
The reason is that all possible deductions are “used up” by deducting the acquisition
cost, which is as high as the maximum valuation due to bidding competition between two
private equity ﬁrms or more.
3.3.2 Tax revenues and tax advantages
Let us then examine how the tax shield of debt in private equity ﬁrms D aﬀects tax
revenues. From Proposition 1, it directly follows that the tax shield of debt in private
equity ﬁrms has no eﬀect on tax revenues denoted by Γ(l).
Proposition 2 Suppose that the acquisition cost is fully deductible at the corporate level,
then the equilibrium tax revenues Γ(l∗) are independent of tax advantages, D.
To see this, denote Γ(t) as the tax revenues under no sale, Γ(i) as the tax revenues
under an incumbent acquisition, and Γ(p) as the tax revenues if a buyout takes place.
15Given Lemma 2, we then have
Γ(t) = [τc + τg (1 − τc)]π(t), (11)
Γ(i) = τgS(i) + [τc + τg (1 − τc)][π(i) − S(i)]
= τgπ(i), (12)
Γ(p) = τgS(p) + [τc + τg (1 − τc)][π(p) − D − S(p)]
= τgπ(p). (13)
If an acquisition takes place, taxes are only collected from the target as the acquisition
price always equals the maximum valuation of the winning owner type. But since tax
advantages do not aﬀect the valuations, they do not aﬀect the tax revenues either.
Summing up, we have shown that in our benchmark model, tax advantages for private
equity ﬁrms have no eﬀect on ownership eﬃciency and tax revenues if the acquisition costs
are fully deductible. The intuition for this result is that tax advantages in the form of
additional deductions are meaningless when the acquisition cost is so high that no proﬁts
remain from which to make deductions. Essentially, all possible deductions are "used
up" by deducting the acquisition cost, which is as high as the maximum valuation due
to intense bidding competition.
4 When do tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms
matter?
We will now make two modiﬁcations to the benchmark model in Section 3: allowing
for limited bidding competition (subsection 4.1) and for limited deductibility (subsection
4.2). These modiﬁcations imply that tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms can aﬀect
ownership eﬃciency and/or tax revenues.
4.1 Limited bidding competition
An assumption behind Proposition 1 is a suﬃciently strong bidding competition between
incumbents and private equity ﬁrms (such that they are forced to pay their maximum
valuation for obtaining the target). Ownership eﬃciency is unaﬀected by the tax shield
of debt even with limited bidding competition. However, tax revenues can be reduced
due to tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms.
To introduce limited bidding competition, suppose that incumbents and private eq-
uity ﬁrms are asymmetric in the (deductible) ﬁxed cost they face when running their
16operations: 0 = fi1 < fi2 < ... < fin and 0 = fp1 < fp2 < ... < fpm. They are still
symmetric in terms of their eﬃciency parameter so that γi = γi1 = γi2 = ... = γin and
γp = γp1 = γp2 = ... = γpm. Introducing these ﬁxed costs and applying Lemma 1 implies
that the incumbents’ maximum valuations are now
vi ≡ vi1 = π(i) > vi2 = π(i) − fi2 > ... > vim = π(i) − fin. (14)
Similarly, private equity ﬁrms’ maximum valuations are
vp ≡ vp1 = π(p) > vp2 = π(p) − fp2 > ... > vpm = π(p) − fpm. (15)
The reservation price of the target ﬁrm is still given as vt = (1 − τc)π(t) from equation
(5). Given the valuations in equations (14) and (15), we can now solve the auction for
the target’s assets and determine the equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition
price.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price with limited
bidding competition are described in Table 2.
Ineq: Deﬁnition: Owner: Acquisition
price S∗:
I1 : vp > vi > vt p max{vp2,vi},
I2 : vp > vt > vi p max{vp2,vt}
I3 : vi > vp > vt i max{vi2,vp}
I4 : vi > vt > vp i max{vi2,vt}
I5 : vt > vi > vp t .
I6 : vt > vp > vi t .
Table 2: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price.
Proof. First, bi ≥ maxvl, l = {i,p} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no owner will
post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and that ﬁrm
t will accept a bid iﬀ bi > vt. Then, competition within owner groups means that the
equilibrium acquisition price must be max{vi2,vp,vt} − ǫ and max{vp2,vt,vi} − ǫ for an
incumbent acquirer and a private equity buyer, respectively. It then follows that a private
equity acquisition takes place at the acquisition price max{vp2,vt,vi} iﬀ vp > max[vt,vi],
and an incumbent acquisition takes place at the acquisition price max{vi2,vp,vt} iﬀ vi >
max[vt,vp]. Otherwise, no acquisition takes place.
4.1.1 Ownership eﬃciency and tax advantages
We can now use Lemma 3 to examine the impact of the tax shield on debt in private equity
ﬁrms on ownership eﬃciency. Lemma 3 shows that the target’s assets will end up with
17the owner with the highest valuation and if the target is sold, the price equals the second
highest valuation. Basically, the same type of equilibria as in Lemma 2 then emerge.
The diﬀerence is that the bidding competition between incumbents and private equity
ﬁrms is weaker, implying that the acquisition price is lower. However, all valuations vj
in equations (5), (14) and (15) are still independent of the tax advantage of the private
equity ﬁrm (D). Hence, even under limited bidding competition, tax advantages for
private equity ﬁrms do not aﬀect the equilibrium ownership structure.
4.1.2 Tax revenues and tax advantages




τgS∗ + [τg (1 − τc)][πP(P) − D − S∗] for π(p) − D − S∗ ≥ 0
τgS∗, for π(p) − D − S∗ < 0
, (16)
where suﬃcient asymmetries could imply π(p) − D − S∗. It then follows that
∂Γ(p)
∂D
= −τg (1 − τc) < 0 for π(p) − D − S
∗ ≥ 0. (17)
When the acquiring private equity ﬁrm has a positive net proﬁt π(p) − D − S∗ ≥ 0, tax
advantages for private equity ﬁrms reduce tax revenues as shown in (17).
The results in this subsection can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 With limited competition among private equity ﬁrms and incumbents,
tax advantages (D) for private equity ﬁrms from the extensive use debt do not aﬀect
ownership eﬃciency l∗, but they can reduce tax revenues, Γ(p) < Γ(t).
4.2 Limited deductibility
Let us now consider limited deductibility, as opposed to full deductibility, of the acquisi-
tion cost. We retain our assumption of symmetric ﬁrms with each group of ﬁrms. Below,
we will show that both ownership eﬃciency and tax revenues will be aﬀected by tax
advantages for private equity ﬁrms.
Let us ﬁrst derive ﬁrms’ valuation under limited deductibility. The net gain function
for incumbents is now deﬁned as
∆i(S) = π(i) − S − τcπ(i) − τg[(1 − τc)π(i) − S]
= (1 − τg)[(1 − τc)π(i) − S]. (18)
18The maximum willingness to pay is then given as vi ≡ maxS, s.t ∆i(S) ≥ 0, or:
vi = (1 − τc)π(i). (19)
The net gain for a private equity ﬁrm is now
∆p(S) = π(p) − S − τc [π(p) − D] − τg[(1 − τc)(π(p) − D) − S]. (20)
From equation (20), we can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 When the acquisition cost is not deductible at the corporate level and D > 0,
the maximum willingness to pay for private equity ﬁrms is vp = (1 − τc)π(p) + τcD for
D < π(p).
Proof. Since deductions D cannot be larger than corporate income π(p), π(p) − D ≥ 0
must hold. Moreover, (1 − τc)(π(p) − D)−S ≥ 0 holds as deductions S cannot be larger
than the capital gains (1 − τc)(π(p) − D). Then, deﬁne  (S) = (1 − τc)(π(p) − D)−S.
The net gain for private equity ﬁrms in (20) can then be written as:
∆p(S) =
￿
π(p) − S − τc [π(p) − D] − τg[(1 − τc)(π(p) − D) − S] if  (S) > 0
π(p) − S − τc [π(p) − D] if  (S) < 0.
(21)





D. However, paying S = vp implies that  (S) < 0. Solving ∆p(S) = 0 in the
lower line of (21), we obtain:
vp =
￿
(1 − τc)π(p) + τcD, D < π(p)
(1 − τc)π(p), D ≥ π(p)
. (22)
The reservation price of the target ﬁrm is still given as vt = (1 − τc)π(t) from equation
(5). Using the valuations for vp and vi in (22) and (19), we can then state the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 When the acquisition cost is not deductible from corporate taxes, in-
creased tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms D can trigger ineﬃcient buyouts (l∗ =
p  = leff) and decrease the tax revenues (Γ(p) < Γ(t)).
If the acquisition cost is not deductible from corporate taxes, a buyout becomes more
likely when the tax beneﬁts for private equity ﬁrms increase. Equations (5), (22) and (19)
imply
dvp
dD = τc > 0 = dvt
dD =
dvi
dD. Therefore, an ineﬃcient private equity ﬁrm (with γp < 1)
can outbid a more eﬃcient incumbent (with γi > γp), since vp = (1 − τc)π(p) + τcD >
19vi = (1 − τc)π(i) if D and γp are suﬃciently large. Moreover, vp = (1 − τc)π(p)+τcD >
vt = (1 − τc)π(t) for γp < 1 if D is suﬃciently large (and γp < 1 is not too small).
Tax revenues now become
Γ(t) = [τc + τg (1 − τc)]π(t), (23)
Γ(i) = τgS
∗ + τcπ(i) + τg[(1 − τc)π(i) − S
∗]
= [τc + τg (1 − τc)]π(i), (24)
Γ(p) = τgS
∗ + τc [π(p) − D] + τg[(1 − τc)(π(p) − D) − S
∗]
= −(1 − τg)τcD + [τc + τg (1 − τc)]π(p), (25)
where bidding competition among ownership types implies that S∗ = vl for l = l∗ and
where we assume that π(p) > D.
We can infer that tax revenues are now aﬀected by changes in tax advantages D since
from (25) we have:
dΓ(p)
dD
= −(1 − τc)τg < 0. (26)
Thus, tax revenues decrease as the tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms D increase.
An increase in deductions D will increase capital gain tax revenues by increasing S∗ =
vp = (1 − τc)π(p) + τcD. But this positive eﬀect on tax revenues is dominated by the
negative eﬀect on both corporate and capital gains through the lower proﬁt of the private
equity owned ﬁrm, π(p) − D.
On a ﬁnal note, an increase in tax advantage D can also trigger a private equity
buyout instead of an incumbent buyout. This will also decrease the tax revenues since
if D = 0, a buyout takes place iﬀ π(p) > π(i). But then, increased tax advantages can
only trigger an ineﬃcient buyout, i.e. buyouts where π(p) < π(i). It then follows from
equations (24) and (25) that Γ(p) < Γ(i).
5 The tax system and Capital Ownership Neutrality
Let us now take a more general perspective and ask what type of tax system would imply
Capital Ownership Neutrality (CON), i.e. under which tax system would the ownership
of the target ﬁrm be the same as in a tax-free system. We ﬁrst show that a double
taxation system is not Capital Ownership Neutral, since acquisitions create deductions
that are not available to sellers. Then, we argue that a single taxation system with full
deductibility of acquisition costs would fulﬁll this requirement.
20In this section, we also show that the presence of oligopolistic externalities in the
product market means that tax advantages are of importance for ownership eﬃciency.
The market power motive of incumbent acquisitions means that incumbent acquisitions
can take place even though a private equity ﬁrm would run the business more eﬃciently.
However, incumbent acquisitions in oligopolies are associated with a friction due to a
replacement eﬀect which could allow less eﬃcient private equity ﬁrms with tax advantages
to outbid more eﬃcient incumbents.
5.1 Double taxation and Capital Ownership Neutrality
Our analysis has shown that tax advantages have no impact on ownership eﬃciency when
acquisition costs are fully deductible. Would then not a tax system with full deductibility
of acquisition costs be superior to a tax system without full deductibility? The answer
is no. The reason is that in a double taxation system, corporate taxes make too many
acquisitions take place in equilibrium from an eﬃciency perspective.
5.1.1 The benchmark monopoly model
Let us illustrate this with our benchmark model with full deductibility. While private
equity advantages D do not aﬀect the equilibrium ownership l∗ with full deductibility, this
does not imply eﬃcient ownership in equilibrium. Even in the absence of tax advantages,
for D = 0, we could still have ineﬃcient ownership l∗  = leff since the target’s valuation
vt = (1 − τc)π(t) in equation (5) depends on corporate taxes τc while incumbent ﬁrms’
and private equity ﬁrms’ valuations vi = π(i) and vp = π(p) in equations (7) and (10) do
not depend on taxes. Let ˜ γh < γt ≡ 1 be deﬁned from vt = vh, h = i,p. Then, it directly
follows that l∗  = leff = t holds for γ ∈ (˜ γh,1). Hence, the incentive for the target to sell
to avoid corporate taxes can lead to ineﬃcient ownership. However, while this can lead
to an ineﬃcient transfer of ownership, private equity ﬁrms cannot be less eﬃcient owners
than incumbent ﬁrms. A buyout still requires that γp > γi.
Its easy to extend the argument to limited deductions. When D > π(p), it can be
shown that ownership eﬃciency prevails. However, whenever D < π(p), we will once
more ﬁnd that capital ownership neutrality does not hold.
5.1.2 Oligopoly
The monopoly model rules out that buyout can occur when private equity ﬁrms are less
eﬃcient than incumbents. In this section, we will show that in an oligopoly setting, we
can have truly ineﬃcient buyouts where private equity ﬁrms are less eﬃcient than both
the target and incumbent ﬁrms. In the oligopoly model, it not straightforward to deﬁne
eﬃcient ownership since under oligopoly, this will depend on whether welfare, proﬁts
21and productive eﬃciency are measured. In this section, we will instead remark on how
ownership directly aﬀects the level of eﬃciency, γl.
Let πj(x,l) denote the pre-tax product market proﬁt of ﬁrm j, net the investment
costs for new assets. The vector of actions taken by ﬁrms in product market interaction is
x and l once more denotes ownership of the target ﬁrm’s assets from stage 1. The optimal
behavior in the product market interaction is given as follows. Given the ownership of
the target ﬁrm’s assets from stage 1, l, ﬁrm j chooses an action xj to maximize its net
product market proﬁt net taxes and deductions, denoted (1 − τc)(1 − τg)πj(xj,x−j : l)
where x−j is the set of actions taken by j’s rivals. We assume there to exist a unique
Nash-Equilibrium, x∗ (l) = (x∗
j,x∗
−j), deﬁned as




−j : l) ≥ (1 − τc)(1 − τg)πj(xj,x
∗
−j : l), ∀xj ∈ R
+. (27)
Since neither capital gains taxes nor corporate taxes aﬀect the ﬁrms’ optimal actions x∗ (l)
in equation (27), we can deﬁne a reduced-form product market proﬁt for a ﬁrm j, taking
as given the ownership l of the target ﬁrm’s assets, as πj (l) ≡ πj(x∗
j (l),x∗
−j (l),l). The
reduced-form product market proﬁt net of taxes is then simply (1 − τc)(1 − τg)πj (l).
With three diﬀerent type of ownerships, the proﬁts are denoted πh(l): the proﬁt for an
incumbent acquirer (l = i), πA(i); the proﬁt for the target ﬁrm with no sale (l = t),
πT (t); and the proﬁt for a private equity ﬁrm (l = p), πP (p). Non-acquiring incumbents
also have three types of proﬁts: πNA(l), where l = {t,p,i} is the type of owner of the
target ﬁrm.
Moreover, we assume that ownership eﬃciency, γl, aﬀects the reduced form proﬁt











This simply says that increased ownership eﬃciency beneﬁts the owner of the target’s
assets, while it reduces the proﬁts of non-acquiring incumbents producing in the industry.
This holds, for example, in the Cournot model, where γ reduces the marginal costs.
Example 2 Let demand be linear, P = a −
Q
s , where a indicates consumer willingness
to pay and s denotes market size. Direct product market proﬁts are Πh = (P − ch)qh ,
where qh is output for a ﬁrm of type h = {A,NA}. The marginal cost of an acquirer
is cA = c − γi and the non-acquirer has the marginal cost cNA = c. Reduced-form


























dγp > 0 and
dπNA(l)
dγl < 0.
Assumption 3 is also compatible with other oligopoly models (Farrell and Shapiro
(1990)).
22Let us ﬁrst review the setting with full deductions. Proceeding as in Section 3.3, it
follows that the valuation of a private equity ﬁrm is
vp = πP(p), (28)
whereas the reservation price of the target ﬁrm is
vt = (1 − τc)πT(t). (29)
However, an incumbent will now have three net gain functions deﬁned as
∆il(S) = (1 − τg)(1 − τ)[πA(i) − S] − (1 − τg)(1 − τ)πNA(l) for l ∈ {i,p,t}. (30)
The reason is that an incumbent’s maximum willingness to pay for the target’s assets now
depends on what happens if another incumbent obtains the target (l = i), if a private
equity ﬁrm obtains the target (l = p), or if the target remains in the industry (l = t).
Using the same procedure as above, we get the maximum willingness to pay for each of
the three net gain functions as
vil = πA(i) − πNA(l). (31)
In Lemma 5, we make use of these maximum valuations to derive the equilibrium
bidding behavior and the equilibrium ownership structures.
Lemma 5 The equilibrium ownership (l∗) and the equilibrium acquisition price (S∗) for
the case (i) vt > vp and (i) vp > vt are deﬁned in Table 3.
Case (i): vt > vp Case (ii): vp > vt
Ineq: Deﬁnition: Ownership l∗ S∗ Deﬁnition: Ownership l∗ S∗
I1 : vii > vit > vt i vii vii > vip > vp i vii
I2 : vii > vt > vit i or t vii vii > vp > vip i or p vii
I3 : vit > vii > vt i vii vip > vii > vp vii
I4 : vit > vt > vii i vt vip > vp > vii vp
I5 : vt > vii > vit t . vp > vii > vip .
I6 : vt > vit > vii t . vp > vip > vii .
Table 3: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price.
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To solve for the equilibrium ownership structure, we distinguish between two cases:
vt > vp and vt < vp. When vt > vp, the private equity owner will not aﬀect the equilibrium
23ownership structure. Since incumbents are symmetric, valuations vii, vit and vt can be
ordered in six diﬀerent ways and the equilibrium ownership structure is solved for each
inequality I1-I6 in Table 3. Three types of ownership structures arise in equilibrium: The
structure where ﬁrm t keeps its assets is thus l = t arising under I5 or I6; the structure
where the target is obtained by one of the incumbents is thus l = i, where the acquisition
price is S∗ = vii under inequalities I1, I2 or I3, and S = vt under inequality I4. When I2
holds, there exist multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, ﬁrm t keeps the assets and no
incumbent posts a bid above vt. An equilibrium also exists where one of the incumbents
obtains the assets at a price vii − ε and another incumbent posts the second highest bid
at vii − 2ε.
When vt < vp, the target owner will not aﬀect the equilibrium ownership structure as
shown in Table 3. Two types of ownership structures arise in equilibrium: The one where
the ﬁrm P acquirer is thus l = p arises under I4, I5 or I6; and the one where the target
is obtained by one of the incumbents is thus l = i, where the acquisition price is S∗ = vii
under inequalities I1, or I3, and S = vt or vii under inequality I2. In one equilibrium
under I2, ﬁrm t posts the second highest bid, keeps the assets and no incumbent posts a
bid above vt. An equilibrium also exists where one of the incumbents obtains the assets
at a price vii − ε and another incumbent posts the second highest bid at vii − 2ε.
Since all valuations in (31), (28) and (29) are independent of the tax advantage of
the private equity owner D, ownership eﬃciency and tax revenues are unaﬀected by tax
advantages. Thus, we can state the following result:
Corollary 1 Propositions 1 and 2 are valid also in an oligopolistic setting.
However, ownership is not Capital Ownership Neutral (CON). Using Lemma 5, we
can state the following proposition:
Proposition 5 In the oligopoly model with full deductions: (i) a less eﬃcient private
equity ﬁrm can acquire the target’s assets instead of the target’s assets remaining in the
hands of a more eﬃcient original owner, (ii) a less eﬃcient private equity ﬁrm can acquire
the target’s assets instead of a more eﬃcient incumbent acquiring them.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2, which is drawn for γi = γt = 1. First, note
the locus of the “Buyout-condition” (BO-condition). This locus shows combinations
of eﬃciency levels of private equity ﬁrms γp and corporate taxes τc such that vp = vt
holds. The BO-condition is downward-sloping in the γp − τc space. To see this, use
(28) and (29) to solve for the corporate tax τBO
c (γp) = 1 −
πP(p)
πT(t) which is decreasing in
γp from Assumption 3. Below the BO-locus, the tax disadvantage of the target ﬁrm is
not suﬃciently large for private equity ﬁrms to overbid the target’s reservation, vp < vt.


































Figure 2: This ﬁgure illustrates the solution to the oligopoly model. In the oligopoly
model with full deductions, a less eﬃcient private equity ﬁrm can aquire the target
instead of the target remaining in the hands of a previous more eﬃcient owner; and
a less eﬃcient private equity ﬁrm can also acquire the target instead of a more eﬃcient
incumbent making the acquisition.
However, for low eﬃciency levels γp, private equity ﬁrms cannot outbid incumbents. This
is shown by the Entry-deterrence condition (ED-condition) where an acquisition to deter
private equity ownership is just proﬁtable, vip = vp and the Preemption-condition (PE-
condition) where an acquisition to preempt a rival incumbent is proﬁtable, vip = vp.
Consider combinations of τc and γp below the BO-condition where vp < vt. Then,
assume that an incumbent acquisition is not proﬁtable at a zero corporate tax rate, i.e.
assume that vii < vit < vt holds at τc = 0. Increasing the corporate tax rate τc, when
the eﬃciency level of private equity ﬁrms γp is not too high, it follows that vit = vt
holds at some tax rate τED
c and that vii = vt holds at some tax rate τPE
c . These tax
rates also mark out the loci for the Merger-condition at which an incumbent acquisition
is just proﬁtable and the Preemptive-condition (PE-condition) at which an acquisition
to preempt rivals is just proﬁtable. For low tax rates τc ∈ [0,τED
c ), the target ﬁrm will
not sell, for medium tax rates τc ∈ [τED
c ,τPE
c ) there will be a sale at S∗ = vt, and for
high tax rates τc ∈ [τPE
c ,1], a preemptive acquisition takes place at S∗ = vii. The latter
follows since if vii > vt, incumbents will always challenge an acquisition by rivals at the
reservation price vt. Bidding competition will then drive the price up to vii. It directly
follows that due to the incentive for the target to evade the corporate tax rate, there
25could also be an ineﬃcient acquisition by the incumbent ﬁrm where γi < 1.
In this setting, private equity ﬁrms can acquire the target ﬁrm even when private
equity ﬁrms are even less eﬃcient than incumbents, γp < γi = γt = 1. This directly
follows from Figure 2. Due to the tax disadvantage of the target, a private equity ﬁrm
can acquire the target when γp < 1. For instance, as shown by point M in Figure 2,
for τc = τED
c , vp = vt holds at ˆ γp < 1. Increasing the γp slightly from point M (where
γp < 1), we have vp > vt = vit > vip. The latter inequality holds because it is better
for an incumbent to have a less eﬃcient private equity ﬁrm running the target ﬁrm,
πNA(p) > πNA(t), which in turn implies vit > vip from equation (31).
Thus, as opposed to the above monopoly setting, tax advantages can then decrease
the ownership eﬃciency since incumbent acquisitions come with a replacement eﬀect:
an incumbent acquisition in an oligopolistic market means that the incumbent partly
replaces its own proﬁt when acquiring the target. This alone will imply that less eﬃcient
private equity ﬁrms can acquire assets through buyouts, even though an incumbent would
be a more eﬃcient owner.
However, an incumbent acquisition could increase the proﬁts more than private eq-
uity buyouts since the product market becomes more concentrated under an incumbent
acquisition. This monopolization motive of acquisitions means that welfare decreasing
incumbent acquisitions can take place even though a private equity ﬁrm would run the
business more eﬃciently. Tax advantages for private equity ﬁrms can then increase wel-
fare if a buyout prevents an incumbent acquisition and the resulting concentration in the
industry.11
It is easy to extend the argument that the tax system is not capital ownership neutral
also with limited deductions. When D > πP(p), it can be shown that ownership eﬃciency
prevails. However, whenever D < πP(p), we will once more ﬁnd that capital ownership
neutrality does not hold.
5.2 Single Taxation and Capital Ownership Neutrality
Given that a double taxation system is never Capital Ownership Neutral, what would
such a system look like in the context of our model? A single taxation system with
full deductibility of acquisition costs would fulﬁll such a requirement. Without loss of
generality, we show this using the simpler monopoly model.
With such a single tax system, the net gain for the target’s owner from selling the
11A caveat to these statements is that we have abstracted from the possibility of the private equity
ﬁrm reselling the assets to an incumbent after the acquisition. For a detailed analysis of the strategic
issues that arise in such a setting, we refer the reader to Norbäck et al. (2010).
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∆t(S) = S − τS ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Net proﬁt from sale
−[π(t) − τπ(t))]
￿ ￿￿ ￿
Net proﬁt from no sale
= (1 − τ)[S − π(t)]. (32)
The reservation price for the target’s owners, vt, can thus be determined as vt = minS,
s.t ∆t(S) ≥ 0. Solving for ∆t(S) = 0, we have
vt = π(t). (33)
Corporate taxes–but not capital gains taxes–aﬀect the reservation value since capital
gains taxes are paid both under a sale and if the assets are kept.
Now turn to an incumbent’s valuation. Suppose that the incumbent pays S to acquire
the target’s assets. Then, the net gain for an incumbent is
∆i(S) = πA(i) − S − τ[π(i) − S]
= (1 − τ)[π(i) − S].
An incumbent’s maximum willingness to pay for the assets is thus given by vi ≡ maxS,
s.t ∆i(S) ≥ 0. Solving for ∆i(S) = 0, we have
vi = π(i). (34)
In particular, taxes do not aﬀect the incumbents’ maximum willingness to pay, vi. The
reason is that at an acquisition cost S = π(i), no taxes are ever paid if the acquisition
cost is fully deductible.
Finally, the net gain for a private equity ﬁrm for acquiring the assets equals
∆p(S) = π(p) − S − τ[π(p) − D − S]. (35)
A private equity ﬁrm’s maximum willingness to pay for the assets is thus given by vp ≡
maxS, s.t ∆p(S) ≥ 0. Solving for ∆p(S) = 0, we have
vp = π(p). (36)
Taxes do not aﬀect the private equity ﬁrms’ maximum willingness to pay, vp. The reason
is that at an acquisition cost S = π(p), no taxes are ever paid if the acquisition cost is
fully deductible. Hence, in a single taxation system under monopoly and full deductibility,
CON would hold and the ownership structure would be eﬃcient.
However, this result does not extend to oligopoly. It is straightforward to show that in
27oligopoly, a single tax system implies CON, but might not lead to an eﬃcient ownership
structure due to the replacement eﬀect and the market power eﬀect associated with
incumbent acquisitions. Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (i) In a single taxation system under monopoly and full deductibility,
CON would hold and the ownership structure would be eﬃcient. (ii) In a single taxation
system under oligopoly and full deductibility, CON would hold and the ownership structure
could be ineﬃcient.
6 Discussion
Let us now provide a brief discussion on possible future extensions to our framework. We
start out in subsection 6.1 by discussing the inter-temporal eﬀects of tax payments. In
subsection 6.2, we discuss organizational form and in subsection 6.3, we discuss personal
income taxes in the context of our model.
6.1 Inter-temporal eﬀects of tax payments
For reasons of simpliﬁcation, in our model, we have abstracted from inter-temporal issues
related to tax payments. This is clearly an important avenue for future research. One of
the main arguments for having a corporate tax and thereby a double taxation system is
that capital gains income is diﬃcult to tax on a yearly basis and is therefore taxed when
realized. This implies that capital income has a tax advantage over personal income. A
yearly corporate tax can therefore be motivated from a neutrality perspective (Gordon
(2010)).
In our setting, the potential seller will in a single tax system have a tax advantage
from not selling the ﬁrm since it can delay tax payments (unless payments are constructed
in such a way that capital gains could be carried forward). This suggests that a double
taxation system with corporate taxes could indeed be CON under some circumstances.
The trade-oﬀ lies in balancing the incentive for sellers to delay tax payments and avoid
paying corporate taxes. We consider this to be a promising avenue for further research,
but outside the scope of this paper.
6.2 The choice of organizational form
Our framework can be used to study the choice of organizational form (partnership or
incorporation) and the tax beneﬁts/disadvantages that it entails. Typically, the general
partners of private equity ﬁrms are wealthy experienced business people with speciﬁc
skills and a strong network among investors and banks. To exploit their skills and have
control over the ﬁrms they acquire (and reduce agency problems), private equity ﬁrms are
28often organized as partnerships. Further, since the basic business idea for private equity
ﬁrms is to restructure the ﬁrms they acquire, they could beneﬁt from not being listed on
the stockmarket since listing entails increased reporting requirements (Jensen (2007)).
For incumbent ﬁrms, incorporation could be more advantageous. Incorporation is
claimed to have two main advantages: access to external capital and limited liability.
Adopting the corporate form requires tighter bookkeeping, accounting and reporting
standards which impose an additional overhead cost that would not be necessary with
a partnership. The advantage of these standards is increased transparency to external
investors and other stakeholders. Therefore, managerial discretion is lower. The owners
are thus able to raise more external capital for any given amount of own equity (although
recently, large private equity partnerships such as Blackstone and KKR have undergone
IPOs and listed a share of their partnership as a way of raising new capital).
Another advantage of incorporation is limited liability. Typically, owners do not
only dispose of ﬁnancial assets that they inject as own equity in the ﬁrm, but are also
endowed with ‘private’ assets such as housing. The value of these private assets is likely
to be higher for the owner than for the bank. Banks can often seize all assets of partners
in partnership including private assets. In contrast, depending on the bankruptcy rules,
the corporate form protects a larger part of private assets due to limited liability.
The economics literature has previously analyzed the choice of organizational form,
and we believe that our framework could be useful for generating additional insights. For
example, Egger et al. (2009) emphasize two opposing consequences of limited liability.
The need to pledge private assets sharpens the incentives for partnerships and allows them
to raise more external ﬁnancing. However, owners attach a higher value to their private
assets than do banks or the market. They are thus unwilling to pledge the asset and lose
it in case of bankruptcy. The need to pledge private assets emphasizes the downside risk
of partnerships. If owners have a suﬃciently high private valuation of the private asset
and are risk averse, they want to protect it against the downside risk even if the asset
could serve as collateral and raise the borrowing capacity. Hence, suﬃciently risk averse
owners prefer to incorporate in order to beneﬁt from limited liability and protect their
private wealth. In terms of private equity ﬁrms, it is likely that wealthy general partners
could protect their most valuable assets in any circumstances and are less in need of such
”insurance” that limited liability provides.
6.3 General partners and personal income taxes
The way in which private equity funds are taxed varies between jurisdictions and investors.
In the main analysis, we assumed that the incumbent pays corporate taxes at the rate τc
on total net proﬁts. The owners of the private equity fund pay capital gains taxes at the
rate τg on the proﬁts net of corporate taxes and deductions. This formalization abstracts
29from the taxation details of private equity funds. In particular, private equity funds are
often set up as partnerships, with limited partners being the investors in the fund and
general partners being the partners in the private equity ﬁrm.
Taxation of general partners–as a consequence of private equity ﬁrms and funds being
set up as partnerships instead of limited liability corporations–could be of importance.
For example, dividends and capital income are in many countries taxed as personal income
in ﬁrms with few active owners. Further, carried interest that goes to the general partners
in the U.S. is taxed as capital income, and there is currently a heated debate on whether
it should instead be taxed as labor income.
To incorporate this into our framework, we could assume that the private equity
ﬁrm consists of only a few general partners. General partners would then pay personal
income taxes at the rate τi on the proﬁts, net corporate taxes and deductions, an analysis
similar to the one in our benchmark model. In particular, we conjecture that if the
acquisition cost is fully deductible at the personal income level, the results derived above
hold with the diﬀerence that personal income taxes τi are substituted for capital gains
taxes, τg. However, if acquisition costs are not fully deductible at the personal income
level, general partners and investors in private equity funds could be tax disadvantaged (or
advantaged) in this respect. We consider incorporating personal taxes in our framework
to be an interesting avenue of further research and that it could generate important policy
implications.
7 Concluding remarks
We have developed an endogenous corporate asset ownership model with taxation, and
applied it to a situation where private equity ﬁrms and incumbents compete to acquire
target ﬁrms. The starting point was that private equity ﬁrms have tax advantages arising
from the equilibrium behavior of private equity ﬁrms as compared to other ﬁrms (and not
from speciﬁc tax advantages in the tax law). In particular, their business model allows
them to better beneﬁt from the tax shield of debt.
We then established that with limited deductibility of acquisition costs, tax advan-
tages for private equity ﬁrms will aﬀect ownership eﬃciency. A buyer’s willingness to pay
for the target will depend on corporate taxes. Consequently, a private equity ﬁrm with
corporate tax advantages can outbid other (more eﬃcient) incumbent bidders. Moreover,
in the presence of oligopolistic externalities, incumbent acquisitions also have a replace-
ment eﬀect meaning that a less eﬃcient private equity ﬁrm with tax advantages can
outbid more eﬃcient incumbents. In particular, we show that these ineﬃciencies may
be substantial when there is limited competition in the market for corporate control and
limited competition in the product market. This suggests that an active practise of the
anti-trust law will improve the functioning of the tax law by reducing distortions in the
30market for corporate control.
Our results also point to the fact that acquisition costs need to be fully deductible from
corporate taxes to ensure that private equity ﬁrms cannot use tax advantages to outbid
more eﬃcient incumbents. However, in a double taxation system, too many acquisitions
take place from an eﬃciency perspective if the goodwill associated with acquisitions is
deductible.
More generally, we have studied the eﬀects of stylized tax policies such as the eﬀects
of allowing full or no deductibility of goodwill associated with acquisitions, and eﬀects of
a double taxation system. Even though these stylized policies abstract from details of tax
policy in practice, we believe that these exercises capture important eﬀects of tax policies.
The complexity of the externalities involved in an acquisition indicates that practical and
informational constraints will be important for deriving optimal tax policies.
Endogenizing taxes, debt levels, tax exemptions and tax credits in this framework
could lead to new interesting results on the welfare eﬀects of tax policy on the market
for corporate control.
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33A Appendix
A.1 Proof Lemma 5 when vp > vt
First, bi ≥ maxvml, l = {i,p} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no ﬁrm will post a bid
equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and ﬁrm T will accept
a bid in stage 2, iﬀ bi > vt. Then assume that vp > vt. Since there are several private
equity ﬁrms competing, the equilibrium sales price will be at least vp. Then, using that
vt < vp, it follows that a sale will take place. This implies that vit and vt will not aﬀect
the equilibrium and we can focus the analysis on the relations between valuations vp, vIP
and vii. There are six possible ordering of these valuations:
Inequality I1 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
incumbent ﬁrm w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets
and ﬁrm s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium,
since incumbent ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will
then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If
b∗
w = vii − ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε], then no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. By
deviating to no, ﬁrm t’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its
valuation, vt. Accordingly, ﬁrm t has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. Let private equity ﬁrm h be the ﬁrm
with the highest bid. Firm h will then bid a maximum of vp. But incumbent ﬁrm j  = t
will have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vp in period 1, since vIP > vp. This contradicts
the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
incumbent ﬁrm w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets
and incumbent s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium,
since incumbent ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will
then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If
b∗
w = vii −ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii −ε,vii −2ε], then no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus,
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that private equity
ﬁrm w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets and ﬁrm
s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vp is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vp−ε is not an equilibrium, since
the private equity ﬁrm then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w+ε, since it will then obtain
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w = vp −ε, and
b∗
s ∈ [vp−ε,vp−2ε], then no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm t’s
payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vt. Accordingly,
ﬁrm t has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I3 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
incumbent ﬁrm w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets
and incumbent s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium
since incumbent ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will
then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If
b∗
w = vii −ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii −ε,vii −2ε], then no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus,
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. Let the private equity ﬁrm h be the
ﬁrm with the highest bid. Firm h will then bid a maximum vp. But the incumbent ﬁrm
j  = t will have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vp in period 1, since vIP > vp. This
contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I4 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
an incumbent ﬁrm w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets
and private equity ﬁrm s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid. Then, b∗
w ≥ vp is not
an equilibrium since a private equity owner will not put a bid above vp−ε and incumbent
j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = vp. b∗
w < vp − ε is not an equilibrium, since
private equity ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε. If b∗
w = vp − ε,
and b∗
s ∈ [vp − ε,vp − 2ε], then no potential buyer ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and
thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. Let private equity ﬁrm h be the ﬁrm
with the highest bid. Firm h will then bid a maximum of vp. But the incumbent ﬁrm
j  = t will have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vp in period 1, since vip > vp. This
contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I5 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
a private equity owner w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the
assets and ﬁrm s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vp is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
P < vp − ε is not an equilibrium,
since private equity ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it
will then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If
b∗
w = vp −ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vp −ε,vp − 2ε], then no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus,
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
35Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. Let incumbent h be the ﬁrm with the
highest bid. Firm h will then bid a maximum vii. But the private equity ﬁrm j  = t will
have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vii in period 1, since vp > vii. This contradicts the
assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I6 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
a private equity owner w  = t is the ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the
assets and ﬁrm s  = t is the ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vp is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
P < vp − ε is not an equilibrium,
since private equity ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it
will then obtain the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If
b∗
w = vp −ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vp −ε,vp − 2ε], then no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus,
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. Let incumbent h be the ﬁrm with the
highest bid. Firm h will then bid a maximum of vip. But private equity ﬁrm j  = t will
have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vip in period 1, since vp > vip. This contradicts the
assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5 when vt > vp
First, bi ≥ maxvml, l = {i,t} is a weakly dominated strategy since no ﬁrm will post a bid
equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and ﬁrm t will accept a
bid in stage 2, iﬀ bi > vt. Then assume that vt > vp. Since the private equity ﬁrms will
never post a bid above vp, they will not acquire since vt > vp. This implies that vip and
vp will not aﬀect the equilibrium, and we can focus the analysis on the relations between
valuations vt, vit and vii. There are six possible orders of these valuations:
Inequality I1 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume that
incumbent w  = t is the incumbent that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets
and ﬁrm s  = t is the incumbent with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium
since ﬁrm j  = w,t then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain
the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vii − ε,
and b∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε], then no incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating
to no, ﬁrm t’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vt.
Accordingly, ﬁrm t has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let incumbent h be the incumbent with
the highest bid. Firm t will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vt. But incumbent j  = t will have
the incentive to deviate to b′ = vt + ε in period 1 since vit > vt. This contradicts the
36assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,y). Then, b∗
w ≥ vij is a
weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vij − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j  = w,t then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vii − ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii − ε,vii − 2ε], no
incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm t’s payoﬀ decreases since
it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vt. Accordingly, ﬁrm t has no incentive
to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider equilibrium candidate b∗∗ = (b∗∗
1 ,b∗∗
2 ,...,no). Then, b∗
w ≥ vit is not an equilib-
rium, since ﬁrm t would then beneﬁt by deviating to yes. If b∗
w ≤ vt, then no incumbent
has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, ﬁrm t’s payoﬀ decreases, since it then
sells its assets at a price below its valuation, vt. Firm t has no incentive to deviate and
thus, b∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I3 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Then, b∗
w ≥ vii is a
weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm j  = w,t then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vii−ε, and b∗
s ∈ [vii−ε,vii−2ε], then
no incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm t’s payoﬀ decreases,
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vt. Accordingly, ﬁrm t has no
incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,...,bM,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm t will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vt. But
incumbent j  = t will then have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vt + ε in stage 1, since
vit > vt. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I4 Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗
1,b∗
2,...,yes). Then, b∗
w > vt is
not an equilibrium since ﬁrm w would then beneﬁt from deviating to bw = vt. b∗
w < vt is
not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm t would then not accept any bid. If b∗
w = vt−ε, then ﬁrm w
has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to b′
j ≤ b∗
w, the payoﬀ of ﬁrm j  = w,t does not
change. By deviating to b′
j > b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s payoﬀ decreases since it must pay a price above
its willingness to pay, vii. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has no incentive to deviate. By deviating
to no, ﬁrm t’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price above its valuation, vt.
Accordingly, ﬁrm t has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,,,bm,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. If bw ≥ vii, then ﬁrm w will have the
incentive to deviate to b′ = bw − ε. If bw < vii, then ﬁrm t will have the incentive to
deviate to no, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1,...,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm t will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vt.
But the incumbent j  = t will have the incentive to deviate to b′ = vt +ε in stage 1 since
37vit > vt, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




∀i ∈ M. It then directly follows that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is
a Nash equilibrium.
Then, ﬁrm t will accept a bid iﬀ bi ≥ vt. But bi ≥ vt is a weakly dominating bid in
these intervals, since vt > max{vii,vit}. Thus, the assets will not be sold in these intervals.
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